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Trust and Intention to Comply with a Water Allocation Decision: The
Moderating Roles of Knowledge and Consistency
Joseph A. Hamm 1,2, Lisa M. PytlikZillig 1, Mitchel N. Herian 1, Alan J. Tomkins 1, Hannah Dietrich 2,3 and Sarah Michaels 1,4
ABSTRACT. Regulating water resources is a critically important yet increasingly complex component of the interaction between
ecology and society. Many argue that effective water regulation relies heavily upon the compliance of water users. The relevant
literature suggests that, rather than relying on external motivators for individual compliance, e.g., punishments and rewards, it
is preferable to focus on internal motivators, including trust in others. Although prior scholarship has resulted in contemporary
institutional efforts to increase public trust, these efforts are hindered by a lack of evidence regarding the specific situations in
which trust, in its various forms, most effectively increases compliance. We report the results of an experiment designed to
compare the impacts of three trust-related constructs, a broad sense of trust in the institution, specific process-fairness perceptions,
and a dispositional tendency to trust others, on compliance with water regulation under experimentally varied situations.
Specifically, we tested the potential moderating influences of concepts relevant to water regulation in the real world: high versus
low information conditions about an institutional decision, decision consistency with relevant data, and decision outcome valence.
Our results suggest that participants’ dispositional trust predicts their intent to comply when they have limited information about
decisions, but the effects of dispositional trust are mediated by trust in the institution. Institutional trust predicts compliance
under narrow conditions: when information is lacking or when decision outcomes are positive and are justified by available
data. Finally, when the regulatory decision is inconsistent with other data in high-information conditions, prior judgments of
institutional process fairness are most predictive of intent to comply. Our results may give guidance to water regulators, who
may want to try to increase trust and thus increase voluntary compliance; the results suggest, in particular, that such efforts be
tailored to the situation.
Key Words: compliance; human dimensions of natural resource management; procedural justice; trust; water allocation
INTRODUCTION
Water management is an essential component of the dynamic
between humanity and the life-supporting ecosystems on
which it depends. Through monitoring and allocation, water
regulatory institutions in the United States (Hightower and
Pierce 2008) and around the world (World Health
Organization 2012) play vital roles in negotiating the
relationship between society and ecosystems and among
competing interests within society (Mullin 2009). Many
factors affect how well regulators meet the challenges they
face and their overall stewardship of water. For example, given
the difficulty of detecting overappropriation of water,
especially groundwater (e.g., Carmona-Garcia 2011, Varela-
Ortega et al. 2011), water regulators often rely in large part
upon the voluntary compliance of stakeholders (Wade 1988),
making a comprehensive understanding of compliance
behavior vital. Indeed, even the best regulatory schemes are
undermined if they are routinely flouted. 
Public compliance with institutions has been examined in a
number of contexts, notably including the management of
social-ecological systems (e.g., Ostrom 1990). Researchers
across contexts distinguish between motivators for
compliance that are external to the person and those that are
internal (e.g., Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Tyler 2006a).
External approaches are common in the context of governance
and are characterized by the use of punishments for failure to
comply and rewards for compliance (e.g., Hardin 1968).
Although potentially effective, these external approaches
usually require considerable institutional resources (Etzioni
2000) and, even when possible, paradoxically, they have the
potential to decrease compliance (Nielsen and Mathiesen
2003, Willis 2005). It has therefore been argued that it is
preferable to focus on internal motivations when possible
(Ostrom 1998).  
Research has consistently found that fostering trust in general
and trust in regulators in particular is a promising approach to
enhancing internally motivated compliance (e.g., Ostrom
1998, May 2004, De Cremer and Tyler 2005). More relevantly
though, trust has been viewed as fundamental for comanaging
ecosystems generally (Armitage et al. 2009, Berkes 2009), as
well as for traditional water resource management (Flitcroft
et al. 2009). Contemporary institutional efforts to increase
public trust (e.g., Cvetkovich and Nakayachi 2007, Davenport
et al. 2007, Lubell, 2007) are consistent with the importance
of trust in the literature. However, the effective use of
institutional resources for encouraging compliance is hindered
by a lack of evidence-based guidance concerning the specific
situations in which trust, in its various forms, will in fact
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increase compliance. Trust is likely not a unitary construct,
and research results often diverge when they investigate
different forms or facets of trust or related constructs (McEvily
and Tortoriello 2011, PytlikZillig et al. 2012, Hamm et al.
2013). In our present paper, we examine three commonly
studied trust-related constructs to identify their relative
influence in experimentally manipulated situations:
institutional trust, procedural fairness, and dispositional trust. 
Across governance contexts, theories of trust postulate that as
a specific institution is judged more trustworthy, e.g., having
competence, integrity, legitimacy, and numerous other
characteristics, individuals are more likely to respond
positively to it (Scholz and Lubell 1998, Murphy 2004, Tyler
2006a, Stern 2008). Institutional trust has been found to be
pertinent to governance generally (Chanley et al. 2000) as well
as being pertinent in various natural resource settings
(Cvetkovich and Winter 2003, Payton et al. 2005, Earle and
Siegrist 2008, Stern 2008, Voinov and Gaddis 2008, Huang
et al. 2010). Regarding natural resources management
specifically, Winter and Cvetkovich (2010:218) conclude that
trust in governance institutions affects the relationship
between the institution and the trustor generally, but
specifically influences “perceived efficacy and approval of
planned or proposed [management] actions.” Despite this
postulated importance, one specific concern regarding
institutional trust lies in its malleability. Some have noted that
institutional trust might reflect overall evaluations of
institutional performance, which can change over time
(Gibson et al. 2003). Others have noted that institutional trust
may be especially likely to be updated when negative
outcomes are encountered (Poortinga and Pidgeon 2004),
leading to the common complaint that trust is difficult to build
but easy to destroy. The implication of such possibilities is
that to the extent that institutional trust may be updated in
response to specific situations, trust measured at one time may
or may not be predictive of compliance at a later time. It is,
therefore, possible that it could be less useful for water
regulators and managers to invest in the development of broad
perceptions of trust if it will be too easily destroyed by
institutional decisions that trustors experience as negative, for
example, restricting amount of water available for irrigation.  
As part of understanding this broader notion of trust in
institutions, researchers have also investigated a number of
more specific constructs that have been shown to influence
positive perceptions of and reactions to governance
institutions. One such construct is perceptions of procedural
fairness, or process fairness. Procedural fairness is a long-
studied construct in social psychology (e.g., Thibaut and
Walker 1975). Researchers have consistently shown that
procedural fairness assessments are influenced by institutional
factors such as neutrality, respectful treatment, and
encouragement of stakeholders’ voices (Lind and Tyler 1988,
Tyler 1989, 2006a,b, Markell and Tyler 2008), and serve as
heuristics by which institutions and their decision outcomes
can be judged (Lind and van den Bos 2002). Within the context
of natural resources governance, Syme et al. (1999) explored
the components of fairness in water allocations and concluded
that procedural fairness judgments were strong determinants
of overall perceptions of regulatory decisions (see also Syme
and Nancarrow 1997). Their conclusion has been corroborated
by a growing body of research that shows that procedural
fairness is an important construct for natural resource
management generally (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998,
Cvetkovich and Nakayachi 2007, Davenport et al. 2007, Earle
and Siegrist 2008, Leahy and Anderson 2008).  
Institutional trust and procedural fairness are often presumed
to rely on some level of knowledge about the institution and
its procedures. More limited public knowledge of institutions
and their actions, however, is not uncommon. Because of this
lack of more specific information, evaluations of the
institution may be more influenced by broader evaluations,
like dispositional trust, or trust in people generally. In this
regard, dispositional trust operates like a personality trait;
some people are more trusting and others less trusting. Within
the context of natural resources specifically, Leahy and
Anderson (2008) identify dispositional trust as a major theme
in responses from participants who were asked to discuss their
trust in and expectations of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers in their area. Additionally, Lubell (2007) identified
a significant association between dispositional trust and
evaluations of specific institutions in a water allocation
context. Notably, some research suggests that dispositional
trust may be most important in situations in which the trustor
has limited relevant knowledge (D’Amico 2003, see also
Hamm et al. 2013).  
Despite the interest in the role of trust and related constructs
in increasing compliance, the relative efficacies of various
trust-related constructs in experimentally varied natural
resource situations have received only rather limited attention,
but see Reeson et al. (2011) for an example of relevant work
in behavioral economics and LePage et al. (2013) for a
discussion of recent advances in agent-based simulation and
modeling. Information about whether specific trust-related
constructs are more or less related to compliance in the water-
regulation context, and the extent to which their effects are
dependent on characteristics of the specific situation is
important. The current study evaluates the influence of three
trust-related constructs, institutional trust, procedural fairness
judgments, and dispositional trust, on compliance in situations
that varied along three important dimensions. In water
regulation contexts, people may have high versus low
information about institutional decisions (level of
information), the regulatory decisions may be viewed as
positive or negative to one’s personal situation (decision
valence), and people may be faced with decisions that appear
consistent or inconsistent with other relevant data (decision
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consistency). We expected that dispositional trust would have
its greatest influence under low-information conditions, that
institutional trust, assessed before the allocations were
presented, would have lower predictive ability when the
subsequent decision was negative rather than positive, and that
procedural fairness judgments about the institution would lose
influence when decisions were made in the face of evidence
that seemed inconsistent with relevant data, potentially
challenging the perceived fairness of the process.  
The current research investigated these relationships in
experimentally manipulated, simulated water-resource
governance situations. Although laboratory studies have
numerous limitations, especially those involving students
rather than target populations, such studies provide a level of
internal validity and efficiency difficult to match in real-world
studies that are likely more ecologically valid (Aronson et al.
1990, Ostrom 2006).
METHOD
Eighty-six students from a large midwestern university, 58%
female and 80% Caucasian, with an average age of 20.2 years,
were asked to complete an online water allocation survey via
the psychology department’s research website. The online
survey included a description of a water allocation scenario
that asked the participants to assume the role of an irrigating
farmer. A variety of measures were embedded (see Fig. 1).
Specifically, participants first completed a measure of
dispositional trust (Step 1) before proceeding to read a basic
explanation of concepts important to water allocation, e.g.,
definitions of over- and underappropriation of water (Step 2).
In this step, participants also received very basic information
about the regulatory agency that was responsible for allocating
water in the area, specifically, about its responsibility to
declare the local watershed over- or underappropriated, and
then they completed a measure of trust in the water regulator
(institutional trust, Step 3). Note that the water regulator was
originally manipulated as a between-group variable (the
Nebraska Department of Natural Resources or the local
Natural Resource District), but no significant differences were
identified between the regulatory agencies on any subsequent
measures, indicating that, for the purposes of this study, our
participants did not distinguish between them. We therefore
collapsed across conditions for our analyses and for the
remainder of this article will refer only to the “water regulator.”
 
Next, information was presented about a hypothetical water
quantity tool that was used by regulators to determine local
water quantities (Step 4). Participants then were told that the
water regulator had not yet made a final decision, but was
likely to declare their watershed as overallocated, thereby
reducing their personal allocation (Step 5, limited information
allocation condition). To make this forecasted reduction
salient, they were reminded that such reductions could harm
Fig. 1. Survey flow.
their yield, but they were not given any other additional
explanatory information. Their initial intention to comply with
this allocation was then measured (Step 6, preliminary
compliance). Next, participants were given the opportunity to
respond to an open-ended prompt in which they were asked
to state whether they were for or against the decision to restrict
water allocations and present their rationale (Step 7). The
open-ended prompt was manipulated between groups, i.e.,
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions,
to provide either a low opportunity to influence the decision
(what they would say to their friends at a coffeehouse), or a
high opportunity (what they would say to the water regulator
at a town hall meeting). Perceptions of the institution’s
procedural fairness were measured next (Step 8). Note that
although the open-ended manipulation was intended to
influence procedural fairness assessments by affecting
perceived influence on the regulation decision, no significant
differences were identified between groups on any of the
procedural fairness items, and so this manipulation was treated
as a constant for the remainder of the manuscript. In Step 9,
increased information condition, participants saw the water
regulator’s final allocation decision, which was either positive
or negative (increased or decreased allocation, reflecting
decision valence conditions) and consistent or inconsistent
with information from the hypothetical water quantity tool,
reflecting decision consistency conditions. Finally,
participants’ final intention to comply was measured (Step
10). The survey took an average of 48 minutes to complete.
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Situational manipulations
Within the survey flow, the first dimension, level of
information, was manipulated as a within-group variable. In
Step 5 of our procedures (Fig. 1), participants received no
information about their water allocation in the scenario, other
than that it was likely to be reduced in the future and that this
reduction could hurt their yield. This low-information
condition mimics many real-world allocations because, even
when information about the reasons for water allocations is
readily available, this kind of public policy information is often
ignored by the general public (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993).
In Step 9 of our procedure, participants were offered additional
information about the water allocation they were to receive.
This higher-information condition also mimics real-world
situations, because many regulatory agencies are working to
increase their transparency by making the rationales and data
upon which their decisions are based more available to the
public. 
The second dimension varied was the decision valence of the
information presented in the higher-information condition
(Step 9), in which the water allocation decision was
manipulated to be either positive or negative for the
participant. In the positive valence condition, participants
were informed that “The actual final decision of the [water
regulator] was to declare lifting (lessening) water restrictions
on farmers in your area throughout the growing season.” In
the negative valence condition, participants were informed
that the water regulator had decided “to declare additional
water restrictions on farmers in your area throughout the
growing season.” This positive or negative allocation received
by the participant was made in contrast to the outcome received
by farmers in neighboring watersheds. Thus, in the positive
outcome condition, the neighboring watersheds received more
water restrictions (reduced water allocations), relative to the
participant’s watershed. Conversely, in the negative outcome
condition, the neighboring watershed received a greater
relative water allocation. 
The third dimension, decision consistency, manipulated
whether the additional information presented in Step 9, i.e.,
the higher-information condition, revealed a water allocation
decision that was consistent or inconsistent with data available
from the hypothetical water quantity tool described in Step 4
of the survey. In the data-consistent condition, the allocation
decision was consistent with presented water quantity data:
the decision would limit the water allocated when the water
quantity tool indicated levels were low, or the decision would
not limit the water when the levels were high. Conversely, in
the data-inconsistent condition, the regulators’ allocation
decision was not consistent with the water quantity tool data,
i.e., the decision limited the water allocated when the data
showed that the levels were high or did not limit them when
the levels were low.
Measures
Our primary dependent variable, intention to comply, was
measured at two points in the survey to assess compliance
under the various conditions. Preliminary compliance was
measured in Step 6, using a single question, which asked
participants, “How likely is it that you would follow any
restrictions imposed by the [water regulator], even if it is likely
to reduce your total crop yield” on a 0-10 scale, where higher
numbers indicated a greater degree of compliance (M = 6.53;
SD = 2.01). Final compliance was measured in Step 10 using
a question similar to the preliminary compliance question; it
asked “If this were a real scenario, how likely is it that you
would follow the policies set by the [water regulator].” It was
scored on the same 0-10 scale as the previous question (M =
6.56; SD = 2.19).  
Participants completed measures of trust in the institution,
procedural fairness perceptions, and dispositional trust; see
Appendix 1 for all items. Trust in the institution was measured
in Step 3 with an eight-item scale that included items relating
to perceptions of competence, motivation, and legitimacy of
the institution, as well as felt loyalty toward and obligation to
obey the institution (see Appendix 1). The specific perceptions
of procedural fairness were measured in Step 8 using an 11-
item scale, modified from one used in prior research (Bornstein
et al. 2013); it focused on the decision makers’ elements of
voice, impartiality, and respect for the participant.
Dispositional trust was measured in Step 1 using a three-item
scale used in the General Social Survey (http://www3.norc.
org/GSS+Website/Browse+GSS+Variables/) and the National
Election Study (http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/
cdf/anes_cdf_var.pdf) that asks participants to respond to their
beliefs about the motivations of “most people” on 10-point
bipolar scales labeled at the endpoints. The reliability of all of
the scales was acceptable to high (institutional trust,
Cronbach’s α = 0.89; procedural fairness, α = 0.89; and
dispositional trust, α = 0.60). Means of the items on each scale
were computed and used in the subsequent analyses.
RESULTS
Analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (IBM Corp. 2011). Before conducting
multiple regression analyses, we examined the bivariate
correlations between the preliminary compliance criterion,
institutional trust, procedural fairness, and dispositional trust.
Preliminary compliance was significantly correlated with both
dispositional trust and trust in the institution, but not with
procedural fairness (see Table 1). Next, to assess the suitability
of our variables for linear multiple regression analysis, we
evaluated the normality of our model residuals (error).
Standardized and unstandardized residual skewness and
kurtosis were less than |0.5|, indicating that the residual
variances were roughly normal.  
Ecology and Society 18(4): 49
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art49/
Table 1. Descriptives and intercorrelations for primary measures.
 
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Pearson Correlations
1 2 3 4
1. Preliminary Compliance (6) 6.53 2.01 -
2. Final Compliance (10) 6.56 2.19 0.51*** -
3. Institutional Trust (3) 3.59 0.67 0.34** 0.30** -
4. Procedural Fairness (8) 3.31 0.62 0.16 0.32** 0.53*** -
5. Dispositional Trust (1) 4.88 1.49 0.27* 0.17 0.35** 0.32**
 Note. Correlations column headings refer to the scales in the correspondingly numbered rows. Dashes indicate 1.0
correlations between a construct and itself. Numbers in parentheses after a measure indicate the Figure 1 step at which it was
assessed. Ns for the correlations = 73 to 80.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
Next, we examined the predictive power of the trust-related
constructs under low-information conditions by regressing
preliminary compliance on all three predictors and their
interactions. No three-way or two-way interactions were
identified (all p > 0.17) and procedural fairness perceptions
were not significantly predictive alone or when other trust
variables or their interactions were included as statistical
controls. Thus, we next estimated a model that regressed
preliminary compliance on only the two constructs with which
it had significant bivariate associations, dispositional trust and
institutional trust, to identify their independent influence.
When both predictors were in the model, the bivariate
association of preliminary compliance and dispositional trust
was lost (see Table 2), suggesting that the effect of
dispositional trust on preliminary compliance was potentially
mediated by trust in the institution (Baron and Kenny 1986).
Because dispositional trust is theorized to be a personality trait
and therefore precedes institutional trust conceptually, as well
as within the survey itself, a Sobel test was conducted that
indicated that the indirect effect of dispositional trust on
preliminary compliance was mediated by trust in the
institution (z = 1.99, p < 0.05).  
Before examining the predictive power of the trust-related
constructs under high-information conditions, we evaluated
the effectiveness of the manipulations, i.e., Did participants
notice the decision valence and consistency of the decision to
the data? Participants were asked how fair or unfair the final
decision was, how positive or negative the outcome was for
the participant, and how positive or negative the outcome was
for the farmers in the neighboring area. As expected,
participants in the positive final allocation condition rated the
decision as more positive for them (M = 4.28, SD = 1.32) than
those in the negative allocation condition (M = 2.75, SD =
1.18; F (1, 77) = 29.06, p = 0.002). In addition, participants
in the positive allocation condition saw the decisions as less
positive for the farmers in the neighboring area (M = 3.07, SD
= 1.18), than did participants in the negative conditions (M =
3.89, SD = 1; F (1, 77) = 9.34, p = 0.003). Finally, participants
in the data-consistent allocation conditions rated them as
significantly more fair (M = 3.31, SD = 0.90) than those in the
data-inconsistent conditions (M = 2.61, SD = 0.97; F(1, 77) =
10.84, p < 0.001).  
Next, we examined the bivariate associations between final
compliance, the trust-related constructs, and the situation
variables in the higher-information condition. As
hypothesized, final compliance was not correlated with
dispositional trust, but was significantly associated with trust
in the institution and perceptions of procedural fairness (see
Table 1). Prior to dropping dispositional trust from further
consideration, we tested its main and 2-way interactive effects
with each of the other potential predictor variables. Because
all effects were nonsignificant (all p > 0.40), we dropped
dispositional trust from subsequent models. Means tests with
the situation variables indicated a significant difference in final
compliance between decision consistency conditions, F (1,77)
= 4.22, p = 0.04, such that participants indicated more
compliance in the data-consistent allocation condition (M =
7.11, SD = 2.10) than in the data-inconsistent condition (M =
6.11, SD = 2.19). However, no significant difference in
compliance was identified between the positive (increased
water) allocation condition (M = 6.86, SD = 2.35) and the
negative (decreased water) allocation condition (M = 6.19, SD
= 1.97; F [1,77] = 1.825, p = 0.18). 
As before, we next assessed the suitability of our variables for
linear regression by evaluating the normality of our model
residuals. Standardized and unstandardized residual skewness
and kurtosis were less than |0.7|, again indicating that our
residual variances were roughly normal. We next tested for
the potential situationally specific relationships between our
trust variables and compliance by regressing final compliance
on institutional trust and procedural fairness perceptions, the
decision consistency and decision valence variables, as well
as their two-way interactions. In addition, because we were
especially interested in the predictive ability of institutional
trust and process fairness perceptions across contexts, we also
included the 3-way interactions of decision consistency by
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Table 2. Preliminary compliance mediation model.
 
Predictor Variables CV = Institutional Trust CV = Preliminary Compliance
β B SE β B SE
Dispositional Trust 0.35*** 0.16*** 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.15
Institutional Trust
 
--- --- --- 0.28* 0.85* 0.35
Constant
 
2.84 0.23 2.41 1.21
Model Statistics adj R² = 0.11,
F(1,81) = 11.39**
adj R² = 0.12,
F(2,77) = 6.15**
 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, CV = Criterion Variable, β = standardized Beta,
B = unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error.
valence by institutional trust, and decision consistency by
valence by procedural fairness (see Table 3). The quantitative
predictors were mean-centered because of the introduction of
interaction terms (Aiken and West 1991), and dummy codes
were used for valence (0 = negative, 1 = positive) and
consistency (0 = inconsistent, 1 = consistent). Results from
this initial model indicated that the three-way interaction
involving procedural fairness was not significant (see left-
hand Initial Model columns in Table 3) but that the three-way
interaction involving institutional trust was significant. To
simplify the model, we dropped the nonsignificant three-way
and the nonsignificant two-way interactions that were not
implicated in the significant three-way interaction. 
As shown in the right-hand columns of Table 3, in the final
model, the effect of procedural fairness depended on the
consistency of the final decision with the data, as indicated by
the significant procedural fairness by decision consistency
interaction. The effects of institutional trust were dependent
on both the consistency and valence of the final water
allocation decision, as indicated by the significant three-way
interaction between institutional trust, decision consistency,
and decision valence. To interpret these interactions, we
computed and tested the significance of the regression
coefficients of institutional trust and perceived procedural
fairness under each of the four final, higher-information
decision conditions within the context of our final regression
model. As shown in Table 4, when the final water allocation
decision was consistent with recommendations suggested by
the water quantity tool (consistency = 1), prior specific
procedural fairness judgments (controlling for trust in the
institution) had no effect. However, when the decision was
inconsistent (consistency = 0), prior perceptions of procedural
fairness had a strong positive effect on final compliance.
Meanwhile, trust in the institution (controlling for specific
procedural fairness perceptions) had no significant effect on
compliance, except when the final allocation decision was
both consistent with the data from the water quantity tool
(consistency = 1) and positively valenced (valence = 1). Only
under these relatively ideal conditions did institutional trust
have a significantly strong and positive impact on participants’
intention to comply.
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we provide a step toward understanding
the potential roles of trust in voluntary compliance with water
allocations. By investigating the potential moderating
influence of the amount of information that participants had
about institutional decisions, decision valence, and its
consistency with relevant data, we were able to examine the
relative effects of three trust-related constructs. We found that
when participants had little information about why a decreased
allocation decision was forecast, intent to comply was
predicted by dispositional trust, and the effect of dispositional
trust was mediated by trust in the institution. This finding
makes intuitive sense. Because compliance decisions cannot
be based upon information the participant does not have, they
must be based on something else. The data from the current
study suggests that, in these cases, undifferentiated
dispositions to trust others may influence compliance, at least
under the conditions we studied. The mediation of this effect
by trust in the institution suggests that, like compliance,
evaluations of the institution, e.g., trust in the institution, are
likely to be driven by dispositional trust in the absence of other
information about the institution (D’Amico 2003). Indeed, in
our analyses, dispositional trust alone accounted for 10% of
the variance in institutional trust (Table 2). Thus, our data
suggest that when a person has no more specific information
upon which to base perceptions of an institution, he or she will
trust and comply with it to the extent that he or she generally
trusts people. 
When participants were given additional information about an
actual, rather than forecast, allocation decision, the
Ecology and Society 18(4): 49
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Table 3. Final compliance regression models.
 
Predictor Variables Initial Model Final Model
β B SE β B SE
Main effects
Institutional Trust (IT) 0.05 0.18 0.72 0.02 0.08 0.71
Procedural Fairness (PF) 0.54* 1.93* 0.91 0.74** 2.64** 0.64
Decision Consistency (DC) 0.42* 1.85* 0.77 0.41* 1.82* 0.76
Decision Valence (DV)
 
0.11 0.49 0.62 0.11 0.51 0.62
2-way interactions
PF * DC -0.46 -2.38 1.35 -0.66** -3.43** 0.91
PF * DV 0.32 1.50 1.36 --- --- ---
IT * PF 0.17 0.55 0.47 0.23 0.73 0.44
IT * DC -0.13 -0.68 1.52 -0.08 -0.41 1.47
IT * DV -0.45 -2.16 1.30 -0.34 -1.63 1.20
DC * DV
 
-0.33
 
-1.63
 
1.01
 
-0.34
 
-1.66
 
1.00
 
3-way interactions
PF * DC * DV -0.31 -1.99 1.85 --- --- ---
IT * DC * DV
 
0.79* 4.80* 2.07 0.67* 4.05* 1.90
Constant
 
5.79 0.43 5.81 0.43
Model Statistics adj R² = 0.256,
F(12,60) = 3.06**
adj R² = 0.263,
F(10,62) = 3.58**
 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, β = standardized beta, B = unstandardized coefficient, SE = standard error
undifferentiated trusting tendencies (dispositional trust) no
longer predicted intention to comply. Instead, projected
compliance appeared to be driven by the participants’ more
specific evaluations of the institution itself, broad trust in the
institution, and specific assessments of process fairness. When
the available data failed to support the final allocation decision,
prior specific perceptions of procedural fairness, assessed after
reading about the forecast water allocation reduction, but
before learning about the actual final decision, had a positive
effect on compliance. Thus, when participants believed that
the institution would treat them fairly even though a water
reduction had been decided, they appeared to be somewhat
inoculated against the negative effects of the data
inconsistency on their reported compliance. On the other hand,
those who perceived the institution as low in process fairness
before receiving a data-inconsistent allocation decision
reported the lowest compliance intentions, regardless of the
valence of the decision. 
In addition, when data were consistent with the final decision,
compliance was generally higher overall, and prior
perceptions of procedural fairness ceased to have a significant
impact on compliance. In light of the recent tendency of
regulatory institutions to make information publicly available,
these findings suggest there may, indeed, be risks associated
with decisions in which the regulated person feels that the data
do not support the decision: specifically, those who already
question the institution’s fairness may be less likely to comply.
However, the findings also imply that there are benefits to an
institution of having previously established a reputation for
procedural fairness under challenging conditions. To the
extent that an institution can enhance procedural fairness
perceptions prior to a data-inconsistent decision, the institution
may increase the likelihood that the public will comply when
an inconsistent situation arises. Investments in general, broad,
and perhaps unchallenged trust in the institution, however,
may not pay off as usefully in such situations. In the current
study, the only decision situation under which this broad sense
of initial institutional trust predicted compliance in the face of
more information was when the outcome was consistent and
positive, i.e., water allocations were increased and supported
by the data.  
Regarding valence and procedural fairness, our results suggest
that fairness effects may not be dependent on whether the
allocation is comparatively good or bad for the regulated
person. This finding is consistent with studies in the procedural
fairness literature (e.g., Tyler 2006a) that find the fairness of
the procedures used matters and prompts individuals who do
not obtain the outcomes they desire to nonetheless rate the
experience higher. Although much of this work was conducted
with criminal defendants, the fairness findings have been
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Table 4. Situationally specific prediction of final compliance by institutional confidence and perceived procedural fairness.
 
Decision features Institutional Trust Procedural Fairness
β B SE β B SE
Data-inconsistent & negative 0.02 0.08 0.71 0.74** 2.64** 0.64
Data-inconsistent & positive -0.46 -1.55 0.96 0.74** 2.64** 0.64
Data-consistent & negative -0.10 -0.34 1.32 -0.22 -0.79 0.63
Data-consistent & positive 0.62** 2.09** 0.75 -0.22 -0.79 0.63
 **p < 0.01, β = standardized Beta, B = unstandardized Beta, SE = standard error.
robust enough to suggest this may be pertinent to water
allocation determinations, where actual outcomes for water
users are frequently not what water users desire.
LIMITATIONS AND SPECULATION
Despite the contribution of laboratory studies such as this, our
research has limitations. First, instead of measuring actual
compliance in a sample of people currently subject to the
regulations discussed, this study measured intention to comply
in a student sample, using manipulated hypothetical scenarios.
We chose these methods to emphasize control and internal
validity (Campbell 1957). Our resultant experimental control
allows some confidence that the differences in predictive
ability are the result of the information manipulations as all
other potential influences were held constant, or at least were
randomly distributed. Nonetheless, our choices leave
unanswered the important question of whether associations
between trust and compliance for students in hypothetical
situations will exist in more relevant populations that are
making real-world decisions, e.g., farmers and landowners.
Although the generalizability of our results to real-world
populations and situations must be tested in future research,
application of the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Ajzen 1991)
provides a potentially compelling argument for why these
student results might generalize to more relevant, real-world
samples. The theory postulates that behavioral intention, an
important driver of actual behavior, is itself driven both by
evaluations of the outcome of the behavior and by subjective
norms. We have no reason to believe that this broadly
applicable theory would not apply to both students and
farmers. Although persons subject to regulation may have
responsibilities and more tangible dependencies on water that
are quite different than those of students, open-ended
responses from student participants indicated that they were
at least cognizant of the outcome evaluations of actual
regulated persons, such that while they are certainly an
imperfect proxy, they are likely a close approximation; e.g.,
one student wrote, “I feel that I might follow them most of the
time but if my crops NEED water I would feel obligated to
my family to keep the crop healthy so I can make money, and
not lose money.” 
Second, the use of our hypothetical scenarios precludes
discussion about direct and interactive influences of other
potential drivers of compliance. Explicit and implicit pressures
from peers and local norms, lack or presence of the resources
necessary to comply, and existing personal relationships were
not manipulated in our scenarios. Additionally, the survey
method itself has the potential to create artificial drivers of
responses. For example, it is well known that survey
participants are motivated to be consistent across responses
(Falk and Zimmermann 2012). Further, real-life scenarios may
contain less ambiguity than surveys. Our measure of
preliminary compliance simply informed participants that the
water allocation was likely to reduce their crop yield. It is
unclear from our results if participants assumed that this
reduction would be significant and so intended to fail to
comply, or trivial and reported an intention to comply.  
Despite these limitations, what lends value to our results for
real-world water regulators is their consistency with previous
research and theory. Our results add to a compelling argument
regarding the existence of a relationship between compliance
and trust-related constructs generally. Across settings (lab and
real-world), contexts (water regulation, conservation, and
legal directives), and kinds of data (qualitative and
quantitative), research consistently finds associations between
trust and compliance (see Ostrom 2006 for an argument about
the importance of using multiple methods in the context of
common pool resources management). Our replication of this
effect is useful because it experimentally tests the effects of
the constructs under situations of practical importance to water
regulation.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Trust is recognized as an essential component of best practices
for managing natural resources (Armitage et al. 2009, Berkes
2009). Of the many trust-related constructs discussed in the
natural resources literature, institutional trust, process fairness
perceptions, and dispositional trust are among the most
common. Indeed, qualitative studies that simply ask
participants to discuss their trust in a natural resources
institution consistently identify these three as important
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themes in responses (Davenport et al. 2007, Leahy and
Anderson 2008). As argued by other researchers and suggested
by our results here, however, the influence of these trust-
related constructs depends on the situation (e.g., Cvetkovich
and Nakayachi 2007, Earle and Siegrist 2008, Herian et al.
2012). Our research tested the influence of three potential
moderators of these constructs and found important effects for
each conceptualization under different situations. Specifically,
dispositional trust appears to be most important when the
participant’s relevant knowledge is low. Our results suggest
that the influence of institutional trust and procedural justice
are moderated by decision valence and the consistency of the
decision to relevant data, such that institutional trust is
predictive only in limited situations, when positively valenced
and consistent with relevant data, but that procedural justice
is predictive when the decision is inconsistent with the relevant
data.  
From our results, we offer some specific recommendations for
natural resources managers. Regarding the measurement of
trust, we argue for specificity in operationalization and
conceptualization (e.g., Smith et al. 2013). Depending on how
trust is operationalized, e.g., as a disposition, broad attitude,
or specific evaluation, its effects in different situations may
vary. Regarding the trust-related constructs most important
for managers, our results suggest managers might be well
served by focusing on public perceptions, especially
perceptions of procedural fairness. Natural resources
management institutions are unlikely to have much influence
over the trait-level trusting tendencies of the public, but our
results indicate that with even relatively little information
(approximately a paragraph in our scenario), the influence of
dispositional trust can become nonsignificant. In these
situations, with the exception of situations involving data-
consistent negatively valenced decisions, compliance was
more strongly predicted by the more institution-specific
constructs of trust in the institution and by perceived process
fairness. These constructs are well within the influence of
natural resource managers. Working to increase regulated
individuals’ trust in the institution is likely to positively
influence compliance in the best of situations. Attention to fair
procedures is also likely to be useful in many situations, but
especially when decisions must be made in the face of
potentially or ostensibly disconfirming evidence, a very real
consideration, given the expectation of increasing variability
in water availability as a function of climate change (Gleick
2012).
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5849
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APPENDIX 1 – All trust items 
 
Trust in the Institution 
 
1. I have confidence in [the water regulator] to do their jobs and perform their 
functions as they should. 
2. The leaders and staff of [the water regulator] are competent to perform their 
functions and meet their responsibilities. 
3. There are plenty of reasons to believe that the leaders and staff of [the water 
regulator] are motivated to do their jobs and fulfill their responsibilities. 
4. I feel a sense of loyalty to [the water regulator]. 
5. Even in the face of difficulty I am committed to supporting [the water regulator]. 
6. People should follow the decisions and policies of [the water regulator] even 
when they disagree with them. 
7. [The water regulator] was established through lawful procedures. 
8. [The water regulator] is a legitimate authority on surface water use and 
regulation. 
 
Procedural Fairness 
 
1. I feel like the decision makers are listening to my opinions. 
2. I can freely express my points of view to decision makers. 
3. I believe that my statements and views would influence the final decision made 
by the decision makers in this scenario. 
4. The decision makers treat me with dignity and respect. 
5. I think the decision makers will act in the interest of some groups over others. 
6. I think that the influence of my opinion in this decision is similar to the influence of 
other people. 
7. I think the decision makers have farmers' best interests in mind while making this 
decision. 
8. I think the decision makers are using fair procedures to make their decision. 
9. I think the decision makers respect my rights. 
10. I think that public interest will be served by the final decision. 
11. I feel that I have input in the decision making process in this scenario. 
 
Dispositional Trust 
 
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful? 
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? 
3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are 
mostly looking out for themselves? 
 
                     Appendix 1. All trust items. 
